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INTRODUCTION 
The New York Court of Appeals’ two recent blight condemnation deci-
sions are the most widely publicized and controversial property rights rul-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  For helpful sug-
gestions and comments, I would like to thank Amy Lavine, Norman Oder, and participants 
in the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s symposium on eminent domain in New York.  I 
would also like to thank Eva Choi, Eric Facer, and Desiree Mowry for providing valuable 
research assistance. 
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ings since the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London.1  In 
Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,2 and Goldstein v. New 
York State Urban Development Corp.,3 the Court of Appeals set new lows 
in allowing extremely dubious “blight” condemnations.  The court ruled 
that such condemnations are permissible under the state constitution’s Pub-
lic Use Clause, which permits private property to be condemned only for a 
“public use.”4  It also adopted an extremely narrow approach to interpreting 
what qualifies as an unconstitutional “pretextual taking.”5 
This Article analyzes these aspects of Kaur and Goldstein, and argues 
that the New York Court of Appeals erred badly, by allowing highly ab-
usive blight condemnations and defining pretextual takings so narrowly as 
to essentially read the concept out of existence. 
Part I briefly describes the background of the two cases.  Goldstein arose 
as a result of an effort by influential developer Bruce Ratner to acquire land 
in Brooklyn for his Atlantic Yards development project, which includes a 
stadium for the New Jersey Nets basketball franchise and mostly market 
rate and high-income housing that he plans to build.6  Kaur resulted from 
Columbia University’s attempts to expand into the Manhattanville neigh-
borhood of West Harlem.7  When some of the landowners refused to sell, 
Ratner and the University successfully lobbied the government to declare 
the land they sought to be blighted and use eminent domain to transfer it to 
them.8 
Part II addresses the issue of blight condemnation.  Goldstein and Kaur 
both applied an extraordinarily broad definition of “blight” that included 
any area where there is “economic underdevelopment” or “stagnation.”9  
Almost any property can be described as underdeveloped relative to some 
other potential use of the land.  In addition, the court ruled that even if the 
 
 1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  For my critique of Kelo, see Ilya Somin, Controlling the 
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 
227-44 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand]. 
 2. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 3. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. (a). 
 5. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (noting that the government is not “allowed to take prop-
erty under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a 
private benefit”); id. at 477 (explaining that  “pretextual takings,” where the official ratio-
nale for the taking is a pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular 
private party,” are unconstitutional). 
 6. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166. 
 7. See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724-25. 
 8. See id.; Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166. 
 9. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 
335 N.E.2d 327, 331 (N.Y. 1975)). 
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property somehow falls outside this definition, state judges can only strike 
down a condemnation if “there is no room for reasonable difference of opi-
nion as to whether an area is blighted.”10  But with just about any area, 
there is at least some room for “reasonable” difference of opinion on the 
question of whether it is stagnant or underdeveloped. 
In adopting an extremely broad definition of blight, the Court of Appeals 
was roughly in line with many other states that define blight expansively.11  
Even so, this definition is at odds with the text of the New York Constitu-
tion, which allows blight condemnations only in “substandard and insanita-
ry areas [sic].”12 
Moreover, the court broke dubious new ground in three other crucial re-
spects.  First, it chose to uphold the condemnations despite evidence sug-
gesting that the studies the government relied on to prove the presence of 
“blight” were deliberately rigged to produce a predetermined result.13  
Second, it dismissed as unimportant the fact that the firm which conducted 
the studies had a serious conflict of interest in that it had previously been 
on the payroll of Ratner and Columbia—the private parties that stood to 
benefit from the blight condemnations.14  Finally, the court refused to give 
any weight to extensive evidence indicating that Ratner and Columbia had 
themselves created or allowed most of the “blighted” conditions subse-
quently used to justify the condemnations to develop.15  Both separately 
and in combination, these three elements of the court’s approach are ex-
tremely troubling.  They open the door to serious abuses of the blight con-
demnation process on behalf of politically influential private interests. 
Part III discusses Goldstein and Kaur’s treatment of the federal constitu-
tional standard for “pretextual” takings.  In Kelo and earlier decisions, fed-
eral courts made clear that “pretextual” takings remain unconstitutional de-
spite the Supreme Court’s otherwise highly deferential posture on “public 
 
 10. Id.  
 11. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and 
the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 307 (2004); Ilya Somin, Blight 
Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 42 [hereinafter Somin, Blight Sweet Blight]; 
see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2120-30 (2009) [hereinafter Somin, Limits of Backlash] (describing 
how highly permissive blight condemnation laws have persisted in many states even in the 
aftermath of recent reform efforts). 
 12. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 9. 
 13. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 14. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 726 (N.Y. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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use” issues.16  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been extremely un-
clear as to what constitutes a “pretextual taking.”17  As a result, both state 
courts and lower federal courts have taken widely differing approaches to 
the issue.18 
Nevertheless, Kaur and Goldstein are outliers in this area, deferring to 
the government more than any other court that has addressed the question 
since Kelo.  In Goldstein, the property owners’ federal pretext claim had 
already been rejected by the Second Circuit.19  I therefore analyze the fed-
eral decision in that case, as well as the state decision. 
State and federal courts have identified four possible indications of a 
pretextual condemnation: the magnitude of the expected public benefits of 
the taking; the extent of the planning process that led to it; whether or not 
the taking has an identifiable private beneficiary whose identity was known 
in advance; and evidence of the intentions of the condemning authorities.20  
In Kaur and Goldstein, all four of these factors were present.  Yet the New 
York Court of Appeals in Kaur dismissed the property owners’ pretextual 
takings claims out of hand.  The Second Circuit did much the same in 
Goldstein.  With one possible exception,21 these were the most extreme 
pro-government pretext rulings of the post-Kelo era.  They open the door to 
a wide range of pretextual condemnations. 
Overall, Goldstein and Kaur probably rank among the most dubious 
blight condemnation decisions in American history.  They make it easier 
than ever for well-connected interest groups to use blight condemnations to 
 
 16. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005).  For citations to pre-
Kelo federal decisions striking down pretextual takings, see Ilya Somin, Introduction: The 
Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1, 26 n.143 (2011) (symposium on 
eminent domain in the United States) [hereinafter Somin, Judicial Reaction]. 
 17. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Govern-
ments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 174-75, 185 (2009) (not-
ing this lack of clarity); Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 24. 
 18. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 25-35 (describing different ap-
proaches to this issue adopted by various courts). 
 19. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Second Circuit applied 
similarly extreme deference in an unpublished 2006 decision, Didden v. Village of Port 
Chester, 173 F. App’x 931 (2d Cir. 2006), which later became briefly famous because future 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor served on the panel as a Second Circuit Judge at 
the time.  For discussions of Didden, see Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s Record on Constitutional 
Property Rights: Testimony Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University), 
available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/news/2009/Somin_TestimonySotomayor. 
pdf; Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 31-34. 
 20. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 184-99; Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 24-
25. 
 21. See supra note 19. 
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transfer property to themselves at the expense of those with less political 
influence. 
I.  BACKGROUND TO THE TWO CASES 
Both Goldstein and Kaur arose in large part as a result of efforts by pri-
vate interest groups to acquire land for their own purposes.  While that fact 
does not by itself prove that the resulting condemnations were unjustified 
or illegal, recognition of it is essential to any understanding of the two cas-
es’ history. 
A. The Background to Goldstein 
In Goldstein, the court upheld a major condemnation as part of the At-
lantic Yards development project.  The Empire State Development Corpo-
ration (ESDC), a state agency, took a large area for the purpose of transfer-
ring it to Forest City Ratner (FCR), a firm owned by politically influential 
developer Bruce Ratner.  Ratner sought to use the site primarily to build 
high-income housing and a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets basketball 
team, which he owned at the time.22  First announced in 2003, the Atlantic 
Yards project was intended to include sixteen high-rise buildings, office 
and retail space, and a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets, of which 
Ratner was the majority owner until 2009.23  The project area in question 
covered twenty-two acres and included a variety of buildings used for both 
residential and commercial purposes.24  Far from being a slum of any kind, 
much of it was actually middle class housing located in a reasonably well-
off neighborhood.25 
 
 22. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 2009) 
(noting that only about one-third of the over 5300 housing units to be constructed would be 
affordable for middle- or low-income residents).  An intermediate appellate court had pre-
viously ruled that the construction of the basketball stadium was a permissible “public pur-
pose.” See Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 424 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 23. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to 
Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW. 
287, 288-89 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 287-88. 
 25. For accounts of the area and its characteristics, see NEIL DEMAUSE & JOANNA CA-
GAN, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO 
PRIVATE PROFIT 280 (rev. ed. 2008) (noting that the area in question was “prime Brooklyn 
real estate” at the nexus of several “booming neighborhoods”); Lavine & Oder, supra note 
24, at 291-94; Damon W. Root, When Public Power is Used for Private Gain, REASON.COM 
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://reason.com/archives/2009/10/08/when-public-power-is-used-for [he-
reinafter Root, Public Power]. 
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Not until 2005, thirty-one months after the project was announced and 
seventeen months after it was endorsed by the city and state governments, 
did the ESDC—the government agency that approved the project and later 
sanctioned the use of eminent domain—conclude that the area in question 
was “blighted.”26  The “blight” study commissioned by the ESDC was un-
dertaken by Allen, King, Rosen, and Fleming (AKRF), a consulting firm 
with serious conflict of interest problems.27 
FCR and city officials claimed that the Atlantic Yards project would 
produce some 2250 “affordable” housing units, as well as several thousand 
others.28  However, most of “the units that are labeled affordable will in 
fact be at or above market rate for Brooklyn, and out of the price range for 
many existing residents.”29  Moreover, FCR is not legally required to build 
more than three hundred of the “affordable” units for many years; in the 
meantime, hundreds of existing housing units in the area have been de-
stroyed as a result of the project and its use of eminent domain.30 
Similarly, claims that the project will produce massive increases in jobs 
and economic development are questionable in light of the fact that the 
project has absorbed hundreds of millions of dollars in public subsidies 
(even without counting the use of eminent domain as an implicit subsidy), 
and the FCR has no legal obligation to actually produce any of the prom-
ised jobs.31  A 2009 New York City Independent Budget Office report 
found that the arena portion of the project would result in only a modest 
twenty-five million dollar net increase in tax revenue for the City and an 
actual loss of forty million dollars in revenue for the state over the next 
thirty years.32  Moreover, the net increase for the City is wiped out once we 
take account of later revelations showing a previously unaccounted for thir-
ty-one million dollars in infrastructure subsidies for the project.33  Includ-
ing this sum in the analysis would make the fiscal impact for both levels of 
government negative. 
 
 26. Id. at 298. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 28. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 318-19. 
 29. Id. at 319. 
 30. See id. at 320-21. 
 31. See id. at 322-27. 
 32. N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL BRIEF: THE PROPOSED ARENA AT ATLANTIC 
YARDS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITY FISCAL GAINS AND LOSSES 8 (2009), available at http://www. 
ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/AtlanticYards091009.pdf.  Unfortunately, the Independent Budget 
Office chose not to analyze the project as a whole, and instead analyzed only the arena por-
tion of the project. See id. at 2. 
 33. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 324. 
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Because the Atlantic Yards takings encompassed a large area and threat-
ened to forcibly displace many people and businesses, the project aroused 
widespread public opposition and a series of lawsuits that culminated in 
decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and New York’s highest 
state court upholding the takings.34 
B. The Background to Kaur 
The Kaur takings arose from an effort by Columbia University to ac-
quire property for expansion in Harlem’s Manhattanville neighborhood in 
New York City.35  Beginning in 2001, Columbia sought, in conjunction 
with city agencies, to acquire some seventeen acres of property in Manhat-
tanville in order to build new educational and research facilities for its 
campus.36  By 2003, it owned some fifty-one percent of the land in the 
area.37  In early 2004, Columbia began meeting with the ESDC to discuss 
condemnation of the remaining land.38  As a result of these meetings, the 
ESDC hired Columbia’s consultant, AKRF, to conduct a “blight” study that 
could justify the use of eminent domain to condemn those properties that 
remained outside Columbia’s control.39  In 2007, AKRF completed a study 
that, as expected, concluded that the area was “blighted.”40  Subsequently, 
the ESDC authorized the condemnation of certain property for Columbia’s 
project.41 
As with the Atlantic Yards project, the Columbia takings generated ex-
tensive media coverage and public resistance.42 
 
 34. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban 
Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 35. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 36. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 12. 
 38. See id.  
 39. See id.  
 40. See id. at 13; see also infra Part II.B. 
 41. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 15. 
 42. See, e.g., Keith H. Hurokawa & Patricia Salkin, Can Urban University Expansion 
and Sustainable Development Co-Exist?: A Case Study in Progress on Columbia University, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 637, 684-88 (2010) (describing the controversy over the use of emi-
nent domain). 
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II.  A BLIGHT UNTO THE WORLD: UPHOLDING UNCONSTRAINED 
BLIGHT CONDEMNATIONS. 
The Goldstein and Kaur decisions both rely on an extremely broad defi-
nition of “blight,” while also overlooking considerable evidence of mal-
feasance in securing blight designations even under that definition. 
Extremely broad definitions of blight are far from unusual in state law.43  
Many of the eminent domain reform laws enacted by state governments in 
the wake of Kelo v. City of New London are likely to be ineffective be-
cause, although they forbid “economic development” condemnations, they 
leave in place extraordinarily broad definitions of blight.44  These blight 
laws allow almost any area to be designated as “blighted” and subsequently 
condemned.45  For example, state courts have ruled that such unlikely areas 
as New York City’s Times Square and downtown Las Vegas are blighted, 
thereby justifying condemnations that transferred property to the New York 
Times and politically influential casino owners respectively.46 
However, several post-Kelo state judicial decisions outside of New York 
have begun to crack down on broad definitions of blight, either invalidating 
them under their state constitutional “public use” clauses or at least limiting 
their application.47  Decisions by the Ohio and New Jersey supreme courts 
and a Pennsylvania appellate court have all trended in that direction.48  
Kaur and Goldstein are therefore outliers relative to recent decisions in 
other states, since they not only endorse a virtually limitless definition of 
blight, but also make judicial review of blight designations in New York 
even more deferential than before.49 
 
 43. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 11, at 2114-20. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id.  
 46. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 7, 
15 (Nev. 2003); W. 41st St. Realty L.L.C. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 
121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 47. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 12-15 (discussing the relevant cas-
es). 
 48. See Gallenthin Realty Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460 (N.J. 
2007) (ruling that open space cannot be designated as “blighted” and condemned); City of 
Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1144-47 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the state constitu-
tion does not permit an area to be declared “blighted” merely because it is “deteriorating”); 
In re Condemnation by the Redevelopment Auth. of Lawrence Cnty., 962 A.2d 1257, 1263 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (holding that a blighted property has an “an actual, objectively neg-
ative use of the property rather than merely a use relatively less profitable than another”).  
The Pennsylvania case was apparently litigated under the state’s broader pre-Kelo definition 
of blight, which has since been displaced by a narrower one enacted in its post-Kelo reform 
law. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 11, at 2141-42 (describing the new law). 
 49. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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Even more strikingly, Goldstein and Kaur exceeded previous New York 
decisions and rulings in other states by endorsing blight designations ob-
tained under highly dubious circumstances.  In both cases the blight desig-
nation was based on a study conducted by a firm with a serious conflict of 
interest.  Both cases also relied heavily on “blight” discovered on land that 
was already owned by the private entity that stood to benefit from the con-
demnation of other land in the area. 
A. A Virtually Limitless Definition of Blight 
Both Goldstein and Kaur relied on a definition of blight so broad as to 
be virtually limitless.  Indeed, the Goldstein opinion itself notes that the At-
lantic Yards area “do[es] not begin to approach in severity the dire cir-
cumstances of urban slum dwelling” that led to the enactment of the state 
constitution’s blight amendment in 1938.50  To get around this problem, the 
court held that blight alleviation is “not limited to ‘slums’ as that term was 
formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic underdevelop-
ment and stagnation are also threats to the public, sufficient to make their 
removal a cognizable public purpose.”51  Kaur, in turn, applied the defini-
tion of “blight” adopted in Goldstein.52 
Just about any area occasionally suffers from “economic underdevelop-
ment” or “stagnation” and therefore could potentially be condemned under 
this rationale.  Moreover, even under this expansive definition of blight, the 
decision allows courts to strike down a condemnation only if “there is no 
room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is 
blighted.”53  With any neighborhood, there is nearly always “room for rea-
sonable difference of opinion” as to whether the area is “underdeveloped” 
relative to some possible alternative uses of the land.  Defining blight this 
broadly, and then deferring to the government’s determination of whether 
such “blight” actually exists, comes close to reading the public use restric-
tion out of the state constitution. 
It is unlikely that Article XVIII, Section 1 of the  New York State Con-
stitution—the amendment allowing condemnation of “substandard and in-
sanitary areas [sic]”54—was originally understood to mean that virtually 
 
 50. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171 (N.Y. 2009). 
 51. Id. at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331 
(N.Y. 1975)). 
 52. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730-31 (N.Y. 2010), 
cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 
(2010). 
 53. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172. 
 54. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
SOMIN_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:04 PM 
1202 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
any area could be declared blighted and condemned.  The earliest New 
York Court of Appeals decision interpreting the amendment described it as 
applying to “slum areas.”55  As that ruling pointed out, the amendment may 
have been intended to codify a 1936 New York Court of Appeals decision 
that upheld the use of eminent domain for  the “clearing, replanning, and 
reconstruction of slum areas and the providing of housing accommodations 
for persons of low income.”56 
This interpretation of Article XVIII is supported by the records of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1938, where proponents of the amendment 
repeatedly emphasized that it focused on “slum clearance.”57  One key sup-
porter defined the meaning of that key term as follows: 
Slum clearance is the redemption of areas where the physical condition of 
the housing and the neighborhood is so squalid, so demoralized, so lack-
ing in light, ventilation, fire protection and sanitation, so overcrowded 
with buildings and people that the existence of such areas endangers the 
health, safety and morals of those living there and impairs the welfare of 
the entire community wherein such areas exist.58 
Article XVIII was one of many state statutory and constitutional blight 
laws enacted during this period for the purpose of alleviating “slum-like” 
conditions.59  Efforts to expand the definition of blight to cover non-slum 
areas only emerged much later. 
In fairness, Goldstein’s definition of “blight” was adopted from earlier 
decisions, such as the New York State Court of Appeals’ 1975 ruling in 
Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris,60 which defined blight 
as including “underdevelopment and stagnation” as well as “slums.”61  
 
 55. See Murray v. LaGuardia, 52 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 1943). 
 56. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 153 (N.Y. 1936). 
 57. See REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK, APRIL FIFTH TO AUGUST TWENTY-SIXTH, 1938, at 1512-85 (1938) [hereinafter CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; see also Amy Lavine, From Slum Clearance to Economic De-
velopment: A Retrospective of Redevelopment Policies in New York State, 4 ALBANY GOV’T 
L. REV. 212 (2011) (describing origins of the 1938 amendment in efforts to facilitate slum 
clearance). 
 58. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 57, at 1531 (statement of Harold Riegel-
man).  Riegelman was a leading advocate of liberal housing legislation and of Article XVIII. 
See generally Dorothy J. Gaiter, Harold Riegelman, A Civic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
1982, at 1. 
 59. See generally Wendell Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal 
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that 
eminent domain has often been used at the expense of individual property owners and to the 
benefit of purely private interests). 
 60. 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975). 
 61. Id. at 330.  The Goldstein majority opinion relied heavily on Yonkers. See Goldstein 
v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171-72 (N.Y. 2009). 
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Nevertheless, these earlier cases, like Goldstein itself, seem to be at va-
riance with the text and original meaning of Article XVIII.  Indeed, the 
Yonkers court itself acknowledged that “urban renewal began as an effort to 
remove ‘substandard and insanitary’ conditions which threatened the health 
and welfare of the public, in other words ‘slums.’”62 
Moreover, no previous Court of Appeals decision had combined a very 
broad definition of blight with the conclusion that, even under this defini-
tion, property owners may not successfully challenge a blight designation 
unless there could be “no reasonable difference of opinion” as to whether 
the area is blighted.63  Indeed, as Judge Robert Smith pointed out in his dis-
sent, Yonkers noted that “courts are required to be more than rubber stamps 
in the determination of the existence of substandard conditions,” and ac-
tually found that the government had failed to sufficiently prove that one of 
the areas it sought to condemn was “substandard.”64 
B. Endorsing Highly Biased Blight Determination Studies 
Goldstein and Kaur went beyond merely adopting an extremely broad 
definition of blight.  They also overlooked extensive evidence indicating 
that the blight studies commissioned by the Empire State Development 
Corporation were heavily biased and deliberately rigged to reach a prede-
termined conclusion. 
As Judge Smith recognized in his dissenting opinion in Goldstein, the 
original rationale for the condemnation was “economic development—job 
creation and the bringing of a professional basketball team to Brooklyn.”65  
Apparently, “nothing was said about ‘blight’ by the sponsors of the project 
until 2005,” when the ESDC realized that a blight determination might be 
needed for legal reasons.66  Moreover, the decision to condemn the proper-
ty had already been made, and AKRF, the firm conducting the blight study, 
knew what outcome the condemning authorities sought.  As Judge Smith 
suggested, “[i]n light of the special status accorded to blight in the New 
 
 62. Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1). 
 63. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172.  A 1953 case cited by the Goldstein majority did rule 
that a blight determination should be upheld if it were not made “corruptly or irrationally or 
baselessly.” Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953).  Still, as Judge Smith 
pointed out in his dissent, this case did not involve the use of blight designations to con-
demn property, but rather a challenge by a taxpayer to the use of tax revenue for purchase of 
such property. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting).  The Kaskel court 
noted that the legal standard it adopted applies only to “a taxpayer’s action under section 51 
of the General Municipal Law.” Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661. 
 64. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 
333). 
 65. Id. at 189. 
 66. Id.  
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York law of eminent domain, the inference that it was a pretext, not the 
true motive for this development, seems compelling.”67 
AKRF also had a major conflict of interest.  The firm was originally 
hired and paid by Ratner himself,68 though its official relationship with 
Ratner’s firm had technically ended by the time it conducted the blight 
study (at which time, however, Ratner was still paying its bills).69  Despite 
its awareness of AKRF’s relationship with Ratner, the ESDC awarded it a 
multi-million dollar no-bid contract to conduct the blight study.70  As a 
lower court judge noted in another case generated by the Atlantic Yards 
project, the ESDC uses AKRF as its “perennial environmental consul-
tant.”71  ESDC officials have noted that AKRF “always produces studies 
that are in accord with the agency’s plans.”72  At a hearing conducted by 
New York State Senator Bill Perkins in January 2010, ESDC representa-
tives admitted that AKRF had always concluded that a property was 
blighted whenever asked to do a blight study by the agency.73  Even worse, 
AKRF’s contract with the ESDC specifically required the firm to conduct a 
“blight study in support of the proposed project,”74 which strongly suggests 
that the firm was instructed to conclude that the area was blighted, since the 
project could not go forward without such a finding. 
AKRF therefore had very strong incentives to produce a study that faci-
litated the goals of both Ratner and the ESDC.  Perhaps for that reason, the 
firm strained to find evidence of blight in its report, counting minor flaws 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 312. 
 69. See id. at 312-13. 
 70. See id. at 313. 
 71. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 426 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (Catterson, J., concurring). 
 72. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 313-14. 
 73. See Eliot Brown, Who Has the Right to Say What’s Blight? Bill Perkins vs. ESDC 
Darling, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.observer.com/2010/real-estate/bill-
perkins-no-fan-blight-consultant-akrf-esdc; see also Norman Oder, At Hearing, ESDC Rep-
resentatives Defend Use Of Consultant AKRF; Perkins Slams “Egregious Conflict Of Inter-
est” Given Simultaneous Work For Developers, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT (Jan. 7, 2010, 
8:35 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/01/at-hearing-esdc-representatives-
defend.html (discussing these hearings). 
 74. Reply Appendix for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants Atlantic Yards Arena and De-
velopment Project—Contract Scope for an Environmental Impact Statement at 28, Develop 
Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (No. 104597/07), available at http://dddb.net/FEIS/appeal/080822ReplyAppendix. 
pdf (emphasis added).  For a discussion of this aspect of the contract, see Norman Oder, 
Was AKRF Really Hired To Do A Study Of Neighborhood Conditions? It Was Hired To 
“Prepare A Blight Study In Support Of The Proposed Project,” ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT 
(Jan. 12, 2010, 2:54 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/01/was-akrf-really-
hired-to-do-study-of.html. 
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such as “weeds,” “graffiti,” “cracked sidewalks,” and “underutilization.”75  
The AKRF study ignored the obvious point that the city government itself 
was responsible for maintaining the sidewalks and keeping them free of 
weeds.76  In one instance, a “mural protesting the use of eminent domain” 
was classified as evidence of blight.77 
Kaur similarly featured a probably rigged blight study conducted by 
AKRF.  An earlier Appellate Division ruling forcing the ESDC to disclose 
relevant documents in the Columbia litigation had rebuked the agency for 
hiring AKRF to conduct the blight study due to the fact that the firm had a 
conflict of interest and had essentially acted as Columbia’s “agent.”78  
AKRF, the court ruled, had been “serving two masters” simultaneously.79  
Because of this background, the taking in Kaur had been invalidated in a 
close three-to-two plurality decision by New York’s intermediate appellate 
court, the Appellate Division.80  When Columbia presented the agency with 
a plan to use eminent domain to acquire the remaining property and use it 
for its “sole benefit,” a blight study was commissioned from AKRF, which 
was simultaneously employed by Columbia on the development project’s 
general plan.81 
AKRF was instructed by the ESDC to use a methodology “biased in Co-
lumbia’s favor,” that allowed blight to be proven by the presence of minor 
defects such as “unpainted block walls or loose awning supports.”82  But as 
the Appellate Division concluded, “[v]irtually every neighborhood in the 
five boroughs will yield similar instances of disrepair that can be captured 
in close-up technicolor.”83 
 
 75. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 298-99; Root, Public Power, supra note 25. 
 76. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 299. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Tuck-It-Away Assocs. L.P. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 51, 59-60 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 79. Id. at 59. 
 80. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 81. Id. at 16. 
 82. Id. at 17.  Later, another firm was hired to conduct an independent blight study, but 
it was required to use the same flawed methodology. See id. at 18.  For more details on the 
biases and flaws in the blight study, see Damon W. Root, Holding Justice Kennedy to His 
Word: Why the Supreme Court Must Put a Stop to Columbia University’s Eminent Domain 
Abuse, REASON.COM (Sept. 29, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/29/holding-
justice-kennedy-to-his; see also Damon W. Root, College Cheats: Columbia Blighted Own 
Hood, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/ 
item_oZsTv770SurlHI5f5BJlQO;jsessionid=DD25B89035A1B3D03970A76560585183 
[hereinafter Root, College Cheats]. 
 83. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
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The Appellate Division therefore ruled that the area could not be consi-
dered blighted; it also ruled that the blight findings were an unconstitution-
al “pretextual” taking, since the biased blight study showed that the blight 
rationale was a mere pretext for a scheme to benefit Columbia.84 
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate 
Division, relying primarily on the extremely broad definition of blight 
upheld in Goldstein just a few months earlier.85  The court refused to con-
sider most of the evidence showing that the AKRF study deliberately used 
biased methodology, claiming only that AKRF’s objectivity was not com-
promised merely “because Columbia had previously engaged AKRF” to 
produce its development plan for the area.86  The court also noted that 
AKRF’s findings were confirmed by a study conducted by a different firm, 
Earth Tech,87 but did not consider the relevance of the fact that that firm 
was also required to use the same biased methodology as AKRF.88  The 
court further noted that a third firm, Urbitran, had conducted a study find-
ing blight in the area prior to AKRF’s study, thereby calling into question 
the Appellate Division’s finding that there was no evidence of blight prior 
to the acquisition of most of the area by Columbia.89  But, the New York 
Court of Appeals did not dispute the Appellate Division’s finding that the 
ESDC chose not to rely on the Urbitran study in making its decision to 
condemn the property, and had in fact commissioned the AKRF study be-
cause ESDC staff doubted the adequacy of the Urbitran findings.90 
C. Blight Designations Based on the Blight Created by the Very 
Parties that Stood to Gain from Condemnation 
In both Goldstein and Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals refused to 
consider extensive evidence suggesting that much of the “blight” used to 
justify condemnation of the areas in question was in fact created by the 
very parties that stood to benefit from the takings. 
 
 84. Id. at 18, 20. 
 85. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied 
sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).  Judge 
Smith, the sole dissenter in Goldstein, concurred in Kaur only because of the force of the 
earlier precedent. See id. at 737 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 731-32. 
 87. See id. at 727. 
 88. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
 89. Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 733. 
 90. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13.  The New York Court of Appeals incorrectly 
stated that the Appellate Division had “ignored” the Urbitran study. See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 
733. 
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In Goldstein, by the time the AKRF blight study was conducted in 2005, 
Forest City Ratner already owned a substantial proportion of the property 
in the area (acquired in part through the threat of eminent domain), and had 
allowed some of it to deteriorate.91  As Damon Root explains, “Ratner had 
already acquired many of the properties he wanted (thanks to eminent do-
main) and left them empty, thus creating much of the unsightly neglect he 
now cites in support of his project.”92  Other areas may have fallen into dis-
repair in part because “Ratner’s plan to acquire the properties and demolish 
the buildings had been public knowledge for years when the blight study 
was conducted,” and owners therefore had no reason to invest in their 
property’s upkeep.93 
In Kaur, as in Goldstein, there was little evidence of actual blight prior 
to the acquisition of much of the property in the area by the expected bene-
ficiaries of eminent domain.  Indeed, the Appellate Division concluded that 
there was “no evidence whatsoever that Manhattanville was blighted prior 
to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of property therein.”94  
The Empire State Development Corporation only ordered a blight study af-
ter Columbia had already acquired most of the property in the area and 
therefore “gained control over the very properties that would form the basis 
for a subsequent blight study.”95 
Most of the alleged blight that was found by AKRF was located on 
property owned by Columbia itself, and was possibly allowed to develop in 
order to justify a blight finding.96  In 2002, not long after Columbia began 
to acquire land in the area, a study conducted by Ernst & Young for the 
New York City Economic Development Corporation found that fifty-four 
of the sixty-seven properties in the project area were in “good,” “very 
good,” or “fair” condition.97  By contrast, the AKRF study, which was con-
ducted just a few years later in 2007 when Columbia already owned most 
of the area, found that forty-eight of the sixty-seven properties were “subs-
tandard.”98  If AKRF’s conclusions are correct, the implication is that many 
 
 91. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12. 
 92. Root, Public Power, supra note 25. 
 93. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
 94. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
 95. Id. at 21. 
 96. See Root, College Cheats, supra note 82 (noting that Columbia already owned se-
venty-six percent of the land in the area at the time of the study and that “the university re-
fused to perform basic and necessary repairs, thereby pushing tenants out of Columbia-
owned buildings and manufacturing the ugly conditions that later advanced the school’s 
real-estate interests”). 
 97. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12. 
 98. Id. at 13. 
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of the properties deteriorated during the years when Columbia was acquir-
ing land in the area, and much of the alleged “blight” was on land already 
owned by Columbia. 
D. Implications 
Both Goldstein and Kaur upheld takings under an extremely broad defi-
nition of blight.  More unusually, both decisions refused to give more than 
perfunctory consideration to the strong evidence that the new private own-
ers of the condemned property had rigged blight studies in their favor and 
were themselves responsible for a substantial proportion of the alleged 
blight those studies found. 
In Goldstein, Ratner and the ESDC disputed some of these claims.99  
The key point, however, is that the majority refused to even consider the 
relevance of a possible conflict of interest, and concluded that the takings 
were permissible even if the allegations against the developer and the con-
demning authority were correct, so long as there was room for “reasonable 
difference of opinion” over the presence or absence of blight.100  As the 
majority explained: 
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass 
as “blight,” as that expression has come to be understood and used by po-
litical appointees to public corporations relying upon studies paid for by 
developers, should not be permitted to constitute a predicate for the inva-
sion of property rights and the razing of homes and businesses.  But any 
such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has 
come to be defined in the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legis-
lature, not the courts.101 
The upshot of the court’s rulings is that developers and other politically 
influential interest groups are free to lobby for blight designations obtained 
on the basis of studies conducted by firms facing an obvious conflict of in-
terest and acting under biased instructions.  Further, the results of such stu-
dies are to be assessed under a nearly limitless definition of blight that in-
cludes any area which might be “underdeveloped” or “stagnant.”102  Even 
under that definition, courts can only invalidate the resulting condemna-
tions if there can be “no reasonable difference of opinion” as to whether an 
area is blighted.103  Taken together, Goldstein and Kaur make it virtually 
 
 99. See Revised Brief for Respondent at 25-34, Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. 
Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0178), 2009 WL 3810844. 
 100. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009). 
 101. Id. at 172. 
 102. See id. at 171-72. 
 103. See id. at 172. 
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impossible to challenge blight condemnations in New York on public use 
constitutional grounds.  As Justice Catterson of New York’s Appellate Di-
vision recently explained, “[u]nfortunately for the rights of the citizens . . . 
the recent rulings of the Court of Appeals . . . have made plain that there is 
no longer any judicial oversight of eminent domain proceedings.”104 
This judicial abdication imperils both the rights of property owners and 
effective neighborhood development.  Unconstrained blight takings are eas-
ily manipulated by powerful interest groups in order to seize property they 
covet from the poor and politically weak.105  Because governments lack ef-
fective tools for measuring the value of existing land uses, and new owners 
of condemned “blighted” property rarely have any binding obligation to 
produce the economic benefits that supposedly justify the use of eminent 
domain, such takings also routinely end up destroying more economic val-
ue than they create.106 
To be sure, these dangers exist even with respect to condemnations in 
genuinely blighted areas.  It is possible that blight condemnations of all 
types should be banned.107  But, the problem is greatly exacerbated if, as in 
New York, virtually any area can be declared blighted and taken. 
Some scholars worry that narrowing the definition of blight without 
banning blight takings altogether might end up harming racial minorities 
and the poor by singling out their communities as the only ones subject to 
blight takings.108  In my view, however, such concerns are outweighed by 
the very real benefits that restricting blight condemnations have for racial 
minorities and the poor.  These groups are disproportionately victimized by 
blight condemnations in areas that are not “blighted” in the lay sense of the 
term.109  Limiting blight condemnations to “substandard and insanitary 
areas [sic],” as required by the New York Constitution,110 is a highly im-
perfect policy.  But, it would be a significant improvement over the status 
quo. 
 
 104. Uptown Holdings, L.L.C. v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2010) (Catterson, J., concurring). 
 105. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 264-67. 
 106. See id. at 190-203 (discussing such problems with both broad blight takings and re-
lated “economic development” condemnations). 
 107. See id. at 269-71. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Con-
demnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007) (asserting that alternatives to blight condemnation 
may be more constitutional). 
 108. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the 
Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2007) (making this argument). 
 109. See Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1931 (2007) (discussing this issue in detail). 
 110. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 9. 
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III.  EVISCERATING PRETEXTUAL TAKINGS STANDARDS 
In Kelo v. City of New London and previous decisions, the Supreme 
Court ruled that, under the Fifth Amendment, virtually any potential public 
benefit qualifies as a “public use,” justifying the use of eminent domain.111  
The one area where Kelo leaves room for significant judicial scrutiny of 
public use issues is that of “pretextual takings,” where the official rationale 
for the taking is a pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on 
a particular private party.”112  Unfortunately, Kelo says very little about the 
question of how to determine whether or not a taking that transfers property 
to a private party is in fact pretextual.113  As the federal district court deci-
sion in Goldstein notes, “[a]lthough Kelo held that merely pretextual pur-
poses do not satisfy the public use requirement, the Kelo majority did not 
define the term ‘mere pretext.’”114  To add to the confusion, the Kelo ma-
jority indicated that one possible indication of a pretextual taking is the 
presence of a “one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the con-
fines of an integrated development plan.”115  But, 99 Cents Only Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, the federal district court case cited by 
Justice Stevens as an example of a pure “one-to-one transfer,”116 actually 
struck down a taking that the government justified as necessary to imple-
ment a previously established redevelopment plan.117  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Kelo also suggested that a taking may be invalidated 
if it showed “impermissible favoritism” to a private party.118  But, like the 
majority opinion, which Kennedy joined, he was extremely unclear as to 
 
 111. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-85 (2005); see also Hawaii 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (concluding that a public use is any objec-
tive “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
(1954) (ruling that the legislature has “well-nigh conclusive” discretion in determining what 
counts as a public use); Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 224-25 (discussing Midkiff 
and Berman in greater detail). 
 112. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477; see also id. at 478 (noting that the government is not “al-
lowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose 
was to bestow a private benefit”). 
 113. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 174 (noting that the Court “failed to provide much guid-
ance” on this issue). 
 114. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 115. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487. 
 116. See id. at 487 n.17. 
 117. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 
1123, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that the case involves condemnation powers estab-
lished pursuant to the “Amargosa Redevelopment Plan”). 
 118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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how to determine what counts as a taking “intended to favor a particular 
private party.”119 
In his thorough analysis of Kelo’s pretext standard, Professor Daniel 
Kelly identifies four criteria that courts use to determine whether a private-
to-private taking is pretextual: 
 1. The magnitude of the public benefit created by the condemnation.  
If the benefits are large, it seems less likely that they are merely 
pretextual. 
 2. The extensiveness of the planning process that led to the taking. 
 3. Whether or not the identity of the private beneficiary of the taking 
was known in advance.  If the new owner’s identity was un-
known to officials at the time they decided to use eminent do-
main, it is hard to conclude that government undertook the con-
demnation in order to advance the new owner’s interests. 
 4. The intentions of the condemning authorities. Under this ap-
proach, courts would investigate the motives of government de-
cision-makers to determine what the true purpose of a condem-
nation was.120 
In the aftermath of Kelo, various state and federal courts disagreed wide-
ly as to the relative importance of these four factors.121  The striking fact 
about Goldstein and Kaur is that they rejected pretextual takings claims de-
spite strong evidence suggesting that all four factors were present.  If none 
of the four factors is enough to prove pretext, the New York Court of Ap-
peals’ approach comes close to reading the concept out of existence.  At the 
very least, if the court’s majority believed that none of the four is an appro-
priate indication of pretext, it should have explained what, if anything, 
would be.122 
In Goldstein, the majority probably ignored Kelo’s pretext standard and 
the lower court cases interpreting it123 because the property owners’ federal 
 
 119. Id.  For analyses discussing the lack of clarity in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, see 
Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 229-31; Kelly, supra note 17. 
 120. Kelly, supra note 17, at 184-99.  Kelly finds fault with each of these tests, and pro-
poses an alternative approach of his own. See id. at 215-20. 
 121. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 25-35 (discussing these cases). 
 122. In a 2007 lower court decision, the Appellate Division invalidated a taking as pre-
textual in a case where the government’s motive was suspect. See 49 WB, L.L.C. v. Vill. of 
Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a condemnation 
was pretextual because “the Village’s true purpose for condemnation was to assist its water-
front developer in meeting the developer’s private scattered-site affordable housing obliga-
tion and to reduce costs to the developer”).  It is not clear, however, whether this approach 
remains viable in New York after the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Goldstein and Kaur. 
 123. See, e.g., 49 WB, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127. 
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constitutional claims had already been rejected in federal court.124  I discuss 
this federal case in detail below.125  Nonetheless, the property owners ex-
plicitly argued that the blight alleviation rationale for the takings was pre-
textual under the New York State Constitution,126 and the Court of Appeals 
should have at least considered the relevance of recent pretext precedents 
from other jurisdictions. 
Much less defensibly, the Court of Appeals also completely ignored Ke-
lo and related pretext cases in Kaur, despite the fact that the lower court 
decision striking down the Columbia takings relied heavily on Kelo’s pre-
text analysis.127  Unlike in Goldstein, no federal court had already ruled on 
the property owners’ Fifth Amendment pretext claims, and the owners con-
tinued to press those arguments in the Court of Appeals.128  Thus, it is dif-
ficult to understand why the Kaur court failed to even cite Kelo,129 much 
less discuss the relevant federal precedents interpreting pretextual takings. 
A. The Magnitude of Expected Public Benefits 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia130 and some lower 
federal courts emphasize the magnitude of expected public benefits as an 
indicator of pretext.  According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, “[i]f the 
property is being transferred to another private party, and the benefits to the 
public are only ‘incidental’ or ‘pretextual,’ a ‘pretext’ defense may well 
succeed.”131  Under this approach, courts “focus primarily on the benefits 
 
 124. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 125. See infra Part III.A. 
 126. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 13-15, Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. 
Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0178), 2009 WL 3810843. 
 127. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 128. See Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 2, 9, 129-39, Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. 
Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/32282922/ 
Petitioners-Respondents-brief (pagination in hyperlink). 
 129. See generally Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d 8. 
 130. This is the highest court of the District of Columbia, equivalent to a state supreme 
court.  It should not be confused with the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit, a federal intermediate appellate court. 
 131. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173-74 (D.C. 2007).  In 
MHC Financing Partnership v. City of San Rafael, No. C00-3785VRW, 2006 WL 3507937 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006), the Northern District of California also interpreted Kelo as requir-
ing “‘careful and extensive inquiry into whether, in fact, the development plan is of primary 
benefit to the developer . . . . [with] only incidental benefit to the City.’” Id. at *14 (quoting 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  A pre-
Kelo Seventh Circuit case also emphasized the importance of the distribution of the benefits 
of a taking. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n, 306 F.3d 445, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2002) (hold-
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the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking” and compare them to 
those expected to be realized by the new private owner.132  This theory 
builds on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo, which suggested 
that a taking might be invalidated if it has “only incidental or pretextual 
public benefits.”133 
In Goldstein v. Pataki,134 the federal case addressing the pretextual tak-
ings claims of the Atlantic Yards property owners, the Second Circuit re-
jected the argument that the takings should be invalidated because most of 
the benefits would flow to Ratner, or because any benefits to the communi-
ty might be “dwarf[ed]” by the project’s costs.135  So long as a taking is 
“rationally related to a classic public use,” the court ruled that the distribu-
tion of benefits was irrelevant.136 
Much evidence suggests that the benefits of the Kaur takings were simi-
larly skewed.  The takings were conducted in accordance with Columbia’s 
preexisting plans for expansion.137  As the Appellate Division recognized, 
Columbia would be able to use the condemned property for its “sole bene-
fit.”138 
The conclusion that the takings will primarily benefit Columbia is rein-
forced by evidence suggesting that the area in question was already doing 
well economically and did not need a massive redevelopment project in or-
der to produce further growth.139  The Appellate Division pointed out that, 
“[t]he 2002 West Harlem Master Plan [covering the area that was eventual-
ly transferred to Columbia] stated that not only was Harlem experiencing a 
renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great develop-
ment potential that could easily be realized through rezoning.”140  The New 
York Court of Appeals failed to consider the relevance of any of these 
points to a pretext analysis. 
 
ing that the true purpose of the takings was “to confer a private benefit” on business inter-
ests because “any speculative public benefit would be incidental at best”). 
 132. See Franco, 930 A.2d at 173. 
 133. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 134. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 135. See id. at 58. 
 136. See id. at 62. 
 137. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 138. Id. at 21. 
 139. See id. at 19. 
 140. Id. 
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B. Pretextual Motive 
The Pennsylvania and Hawaii supreme courts interpret Kelo’s pretextual 
taking inquiry as focusing primarily on the actual intentions of condemning 
authorities and the plausibility of the condemning authority’s asserted 
goals.  In Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone,141 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court interpreted Kelo as requiring the court to examine “the real or 
fundamental purpose behind a taking,” emphasizing that “the true purpose 
must primarily benefit the public.”142  The Hawaii Supreme Court adopted 
a similar standard,143 as did several pre-Kelo federal court decisions.144 
In Goldstein v. Pataki, the Second Circuit simply refused to consider any 
evidence of improper motive, ruling that whenever a taking is “rationally 
related to a classic public use,” it is impermissible to “give close scrutiny to 
the mechanics of a taking . . . as a means to gauge the purity of the motives 
of various government officials who approved it.”145  The court also made 
clear that its definition of “classic public use” is extremely broad, noting 
that private-to-private blight takings and “the creation of affordable hous-
ing” qualify.146 
The Second Circuit’s refusal to consider evidence of motive was ex-
tremely unfortunate in light of the highly suspicious circumstances sur-
rounding the taking.  As discussed above,147 the ESDC decided to conduct 
a blight study only after it and Ratner already intended to use eminent do-
main against the property owners.148  It also relied on a firm with a serious 
 
 141. 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007). 
 142. Id. at 337; see also In re O’Reilly, 5 A.3d 246, 250 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Middletown 
Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 337 (Pa. 2007)). 
 143. See Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 647-49 (Haw. 
2008) (holding that Kelo requires courts to look for “the actual purpose” of a taking to de-
termine whether the official rationale was “a mere pretext”). 
 144. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (in-
validating a taking because the official rationale of blight alleviation was a mere pretext for 
“a scheme . . . to deprive the plaintiffs of their property . . . so a shopping-center developer 
could buy [it] at a lower price”); Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1174-76 
(E.D. Mo. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prop-
erty owner was likely to prevail on a claim that a taking ostensibly to alleviate blight was 
actually intended to serve the interests of the Target corporation); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. 
v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Courts 
must look beyond the government’s purported public use to determine whether that is the 
genuine reason or if it is merely pretext.”); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelop-
ment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“No judicial deference is re-
quired . . . where the ostensible public use is demonstrably pretextual.”). 
 145. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 146. Id. at 58. 
 147. See supra Part II.B. 
 148. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
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conflict of interest to conduct the study.149  All of this is at the very least 
relevant evidence of pretextual intent.150 
In Kaur, as in Goldstein, there was extensive evidence of pretextual mo-
tive inherent in the blight designation process.  The fact that the ESDC re-
lied on AKRF, despite its conflict of interest, and instructed the firm to use 
a highly biased methodology is surely relevant.151 
In addition, the Appellate Division found further evidence of improper 
motive in the ESDC’s behavior with regard to its treatment of the property 
owners’ Freedom of Information Law requests.152  The ESDC improperly 
withheld key documents from the owners in order to prevent them from us-
ing them in administrative hearings assessing the validity of the planned 
takings.153  As the Appellate Division explained, 
[i]t is beyond dispute that, as the cutoff date to enter documents into the 
record approached, the respondent and other agencies engaged in a last-
ditch effort to thwart the petitioners’ attempt to obtain documents, includ-
ing those which were ordered by the courts of this State to be released and 
turned over. . . .”154 
The ESDC thus deprived the owners of vital information needed to chal-
lenge the project at the only time such evidence could be used.  The failure 
to release these documents indicates the extent to which the ESDC was 
willing to take any action in order to push the project through, and provides 
at least some additional evidence of pretextual motive.155  The New York 
Court of Appeals’ ruling simply ignored that evidence. 
C. The Extent of the Pre-Condemnation Planning Process 
The Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island Supreme Courts have re-
lied on the absence of extensive advance public planning to indicate a pre-
textual taking.156  This theory builds on Kelo’s emphasis on the presence of 
 
 149. Id. at 167. 
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
 151. See supra Part II.B.  
 152. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 153. Id. at 27-28. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (plurality); id. at 30-32 (Richter, J., concurring). 
 156. See Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 352-53 (Md. 2007) (noting the ab-
sence of a clear plan for the use of the condemned property, and contrasting this absence 
with the facts of Kelo); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007) 
(concluding that “evidence of a well-developed plan of proper scope is significant proof that 
an authorized purpose truly motivates a taking”); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 
A.2d 87, 104 (R.I. 2006) (emphasizing that “[t]he City of New London’s exhaustive prepa-
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an “integrated development plan” behind the takings upheld in that case.157  
It is difficult to say exactly how much advance planning is needed under 
this approach to ward off pretext claims. 
In Goldstein v. Pataki, the Second Circuit rejected the idea that any sig-
nificant scrutiny was required because of the “acknowledged fact that 
Ratner was the impetus behind the Project, i.e., that he, not a state agency, 
first conceived of developing Atlantic Yards . . . and that it was his plan for 
the Project that the ESDC eventually adopted without significant modifica-
tion.”158  If a planning process completely dominated by a private benefi-
ciary does not qualify as pretextual, it is difficult to see what sort of process 
would. 
In Kaur as well, the relevant plan was developed by Columbia Universi-
ty—the very private interest that stood to benefit from the condemna-
tions.159  The blight alleviation plan was produced after the condemning au-
thority had already decided to condemn the property and transfer it to 
Columbia.160  The Appellate Division found that “[t]he record discloses 
that every document constituting the plan was drafted by the preselected 
private beneficiary’s [Columbia’s] attorneys and consultants and archi-
tects.”161  As the Appellate Division concluded, “[t]he contrast between 
ESDC’s scheme for the redevelopment of Manhattanville and New Lon-
don’s plan for Fort Trumbull could not be more dramatic.”162  Although the 
New London plan was far from free of special interest influence,163 at least 
it was not developed in advance by the very private party that would even-
tually take over the condemned property. 
D. The Presence of a Known Private Beneficiary of the Taking 
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo note that there is a 
greater risk of a pretextual taking when the taking’s private beneficiary is 
 
ratory efforts that preceded the takings in Kelo stand in stark contrast to [the condemning 
authority’s] approach in the case before us”). 
 157. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487-88 (2005); cf. Nicole S. Gar-
nett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007) (arguing that planning is 
the main focus of Kelo’s pretext analysis). 
 158. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 159. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 19-21. 
 160. See supra Part II.B. 
 161. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20. 
 162. Id. at 19. 
 163. See Somin, Grasping Hand,  supra note 1, at 236-38 (describing evidence of exten-
sive influence by the Pfizer Corporation, which stood to benefit from the takings indirectly). 
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known in advance.164  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on 
this factor in a 2008 decision.  In Carole Media L.L.C. v. New Jersey Tran-
sit Corp.,165 the court upheld a taking of a firm’s license to post advertise-
ments on public billboards owned by the New Jersey Transit Corpora-
tion.166  Although there was evidence that the new policy was adopted in 
part because it was likely to favor the interests of a rival firm, All Vision,167 
the court upheld the condemnations in large part because there was “no al-
legation that NJ Transit, at the time it terminated Carole Media’s existing 
licenses, knew the identity of the successful bidder for the long-term li-
censes at those locations.”168 
No one disputes that Ratner was the private beneficiary of the takings 
upheld in Goldstein, and that his identity as such was well-known in ad-
vance of the decision to condemn.169  Yet neither the Second Circuit nor 
the New York Court of Appeals gave any weight to this fact.170 
Similarly, there is no doubt that Columbia was the expected beneficiary 
of the Kaur condemnations, and that the ESDC was well aware of this real-
ity.171  Nevertheless, in Kaur too, the New York Court of Appeals did not 
attach any weight to the presence of a known private beneficiary.172 
E. Implications 
In sum, both the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur and the Second 
Circuit in Goldstein refused to give weight to any of the four factors identi-
fied in Kelo and various lower court decisions as possible indicators of pre-
textual takings.  Nor did either ruling suggest any alternative test. The 
Second Circuit did note that its decision “preserve[es] the possibility that a 
fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances of the approval 
process so greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the outcome reached 
 
 164. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 n.6 (2005) (noting that it is 
“difficult to accuse the government of having taken A’s property to benefit the private inter-
ests of B when the identity of B was unknown”); id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 165. 550 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 166. Id. at 312. 
 167. Id. at 310-11. 
 168. Id. at 311.  As a result of this ignorance, the court ruled that “this case cannot be the 
textbook private taking involving a naked transfer of property from private party A to B 
solely for B’s private use.” Id. 
 169. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 170. See id.; Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y. 
2009). 
 171. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 725-26 (N.Y. 2010), 
cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 
(2010). 
 172. See id. at 724. 
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that a closer objective scrutiny of the justification being offered is re-
quired.”173  But it is difficult to see what those circumstances might be if 
neither subjective intent, nor the distribution of the projects costs and bene-
fits, nor the presence of an identifiable private beneficiary who played a 
key role in initiating the taking, is enough to trigger such “objective scruti-
ny.” 
CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals’ treatment of “blight” takings in 
Goldstein and Kaur breaks new and dangerous ground in endorsing abusive 
condemnations.  It both defines blight more expansively than ever before 
and allows blight designations to be obtained by extremely dubious means.  
These include the use of consulting firms with severe conflicts of interest 
and reliance on evidence of blight that may have been produced by the very 
same private interest groups that stand to benefit from the condemnation 
that the blight finding is intended to justify. 
The New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit have also vir-
tually ignored the federal Supreme Court’s mandate that “pretextual” tak-
ings remain unconstitutional even under the Court’s otherwise highly per-
missive public use jurisprudence.174 
As a result of these two rulings, there are virtually no remaining consti-
tutional limits on blight condemnations in New York state, including 
America’s largest city. 
To be sure, abusive blight condemnations still readily occur even under 
less permissive legal regimes.  Had the New York Court of Appeals 
adopted a broad definition of blight but refused to countenance the use of 
biased consulting firms or evidence of blight generated by the beneficiaries 
of takings, government agencies would probably still be able to get a blight 
designation for most, if not quite all, the areas potentially coveted by in-
fluential interest groups. 
Even so, the court’s endorsement of blight designations produced by bi-
ased firms and based on conditions that interested parties helped create, 
creates genuine harm.  It makes it difficult to constrain blight condemna-
tions even if the definition of blight were to be narrowed.  A biased firm 
could potentially manufacture evidence of more narrowly defined blight.  
And an ambitious developer could allow such blight to develop on his land 
in the hopes of using it to lobby for the use of eminent domain to acquire 
nearby land that he or she covets.  Effective eminent domain reform re-
 
 173. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63. 
 174. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005). 
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quires both narrowing the definition of “blight” and the reimposition of 
constraints on corrupt blight designation practices.175 
 
 175. On the former point, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 266-71.  It is argu-
able that the use of eminent domain may do more harm than good, even in genuinely 
blighted areas. See id. at 269-71; see also Eagle, supra note 107 (arguing that “‘blight con-
demnation’ is dubious at best” and that abatement, foreclosure, and private revitalization are 
“more in accord with Constitutional requirements and more likely to produce transparent 
and efficacious results”). 
